



ABSTR AC T. Why has the promise of Gideon gone largely unfulfilled and what can be learned
from this? Gideon was an unfunded mandate to state governments, requiring them to provide the
money to ensure competent counsel for all criminal defendants facing possible prison sentences.
Gideon failed to provide any enforcement mechanism to ensure adequate funding and no
subsequent cases have done so. Nor did Gideon recognize that providing an attorney is not
sufficient; it must be a competent lawyer. The Supreme Court has made it so difficult to
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel that those who cannot afford an attorney often are
saddled with incompetent counsel and are left with no remedy. Simply put, money matters in
fulfilling Gideon's promise and the Court provided no way of ensuring adequate funding.
Providing adequate funding for counsel, whether in criminal or civil or immigration cases,
will be problematic so long as it is a welfare program for the poor. The right to counsel will be
meaningful only if there are enforcement mechanisms to ensure adequate funding and the
provision of competent counsel.
A UT H OR. Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School
of Law. I am grateful to Phil Syers for his excellent research assistance and to Catherine Fisk for
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INTRODUCTION
The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright' deserves celebration.
Gideon's assurance of counsel to all facing a prison sentence undoubtedly has
meant that many who otherwise would have been convicted and imprisoned,
some wrongly, were able to be free. In fact, there have likely been countless
instances of prosecutors not even going forward simply because of the presence
of defense counsel. In a criminal justice system where almost all convictions are
gained by guilty pleas - ninety-seven percent in federal court and ninety-four
percent in state court - the presence of defense attorneys surely often makes an
enormous difference in the nature of the plea deal and the length of the
sentence.
None of these effects can be measured. It is not possible to know the
number of people who were acquitted who would have been convicted, or the
number of cases not brought, or the length of the sentences not imposed. But
nor can these benefits be denied by anyone with even a passing familiarity with
the criminal justice system.
The importance of Gideon as a symbol also cannot be overstated. An
adversary system of justice requires some semblance of equality between the
two sides. Gideon is a crucial attempt to make that a reality. It holds that all
facing the power of the state to take away their liberty, however poor, are
entitled to representation. Under a Constitution that often is described as being
a charter of negative liberties, restrictions on government power, and not
affirmative rights,' Gideon holds that there is something the government must
pay for and provide: an attorney to those who cannot afford one and face the
loss of their liberty by imprisonment. As the Court powerfully declared in
Gideon:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
1. 372 U.S. 336 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that state
governments provide an attorney to all indigent defendants facing a possible prison
sentence).
2. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.").
3. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(holding that the government has no duty to protect individuals from privately inflicted
harms); see also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271




for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. . .. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure
fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him. 4
Yet while Gideon is celebrated, the reality of its implementation must be
lamented, too. A decade ago, on the fortieth anniversary of Gideon, an
American Bar Association study concluded: "Forty years after Gideon v.
Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States remains in a state of crisis,
resulting in a system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at
constant risk of wrongful conviction... . Funding for indigent defense services
is shamefully inadequate."s Over the last decade, the problem undoubtedly has
gotten much worse as the severe recession has caused budget crises in states
across the country and cuts in funding for courts and all the services they
provide.'
As someone who handles criminal appeals, I have represented clients whom
I believe to be innocent who were convicted because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.! I have also represented clients whom I am convinced received death
sentences because their trial lawyers were ineffective." In instances like these, I
wonder whether these individuals really were better off because of Gideon.
Perhaps if they had been left to represent themselves they would have done
better, or perhaps the courts would have looked more closely at their cases.
Gideon creates such a strong presumption that the presence of counsel has
insured adequate representation when the reality is so very different. As
4. 372 U.S. at 344.
5. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 38 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dan/aba/administrative/legal-aidjindigent-defendants/1s sclaiddefbpjrightto
_counsel in criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISE].
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium on State Court Funding: Keynote Address, loo KY. L.J. 743,
744 (2012) (describing budget cuts in court funding across the country).
7. E.g., Haskell v. Berghuis, No. 10-1432, 2013 WL 163965 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (rejecting a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
8. E.g., Wilkinson v. Polk, 227 F. App'x 210 (4 th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel).
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Senator Patrick Leahy has remarked, "Too often individuals facing the ultimate
punishment are represented by lawyers who are drunk, sleeping, soon-to-be
disbarred or just plain ineffective. Even the best lawyers in these systems are
hampered by inadequate compensation and insufficient resources to investigate
and develop a meaningful defense."9
In these remarks, I want to focus on what explains Gideon's failure. I focus
specifically on the failure to adequately fund the right to counsel that Gideon
promised. Part I describes the crucial importance of funding to fulfilling the
promise of Gideon v. Wainwright. Part II explains why the right to counsel has
been inadequately funded and points to two interrelated phenomena: The
Court imposed an unfunded mandate on state governments without any
enforcement mechanism, and the Court then undermined the one remedy
available to the judiciary, the ability to find ineffective assistance of counsel.
Part III concludes by drawing lessons from Gideon for other areas, including
the attempt to extend it to the civil arena. Funding inherently will be
inadequate when reliance is on state and local governments to provide services
for the poorest in society.
To be clear, I join the celebration of Gideon and its importance. It is a
"watershed" rule of criminal procedure."o I realize, as stated above, that so
many of its benefits never can be quantified and can be so easily taken for
granted. But I also lament its unfulfilled promise, and that is the focus of my
discussion.
1. LAWYERS MATTER, MONEY MATTERS
My premise is a simple one: the quality of representation often matters in
criminal cases, and money often is crucial in determining that quality of
representation. Of course, there are instances where the outcome is the same
no matter how good or bad the defense lawyer. Of course, there are instances
where the best-paid lawyer does a poor job or the inadequately compensated
attorney is terrific. But, that said, any one of us facing criminal charges would
want the best lawyer we could get, and being able to pay for him or her
matters.
The most powerful evidence of this comes from studies that have compared
the outcomes of cases depending on how the lawyer is compensated. The
Bureau of Justice Statistics found that those with publicly funded counsel are
g. 150 CONG. REC. Sil,613 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (Statement of Sen. Leahy).
1o. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 4o6, 418-19 (2007) (referring to Gideon as a watershed




more likely to be incarcerated for longer than those with privately paid
attorneys." It concluded: "Of defendants found guilty in Federal district
courts, 88% with publicly financed counsel and 77% with private counsel
received jail or prison sentences; in large state courts, 71% with public counsel
and 54% with private attorneys were sentenced to incarceration." 2
Moreover, among those cases involving publicly paid attorneys, the
sentencing outcome varies depending on whether there is a public defender or
appointed counsel. Similarly, in federal court, outcomes depend on whether
there is a federal defender or an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice
Act." Professor Radha Iyengar has concluded that "[d]efendants with CJA
panel attorneys are on average more likely to be found guilty and on average to
receive longer sentences. Overall, the expected sentence for defendants with
CJA panel attorneys is nearly 8 months longer.""4
The same difference has been found in state courts. James M. Anderson
and Paul Heaton compared the outcomes in murder cases in Philadelphia
courts depending on whether the defendant was represented by a public
defender or an appointed lawyer from a list." They found that, compared to
appointed counsel, public defenders reduce their clients' murder conviction
rate by 19% and lower the probability that their client will receive a life
sentence by 62%. Public defenders, as compared to appointed counsel, reduce
overall expected time served in prison by 24%." To say the obvious, these are
dramatic differences.
Many studies have been done in capital cases and they are remarkably
consistent in documenting that a conviction and death sentence in a capital case
is least likely with a privately paid lawyer, and that those with government-
paid attorneys are much better off with public defenders than with appointed
ii. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Nov.
2000), http://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
1. Id. at i.
13. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel (Nat'I
Bureau ofEcon. Res., Working Paper No. 13187, 2007).
14. Id. at 3.
15. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?: The Effect
ofDefense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012).
16. Id. at 159.
17. Id.
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counsel."
The advice to a person facing prosecution, especially for a serious crime,
would be clear: if you can, hire your own attorney. Failing that, do all you can
to get representation by a public defender rather than by a court-appointed
attorney. Why? Anderson and Heaton offer a compelling explanation:
We find that, in general, appointed counsel have comparatively few
resources, face more difficult incentives, and are more isolated than
public defenders. The extremely low compensation for appointed
counsel reduces the pool of attorneys willing to take the appointments
and makes extensive preparation economically undesirable. Moreover,
the judges selecting counsel may be doing so for reasons partly
unrelated to counsel's efficacy. In contrast, the public defenders' steady
salaries, financial and institutional independence from judges, and team
approach to indigent defense avoid many of these problems. These
longer-term institutional differences lead to the more immediate cause
of the difference in outcomes: less preparation by appointed counsel. 9
Simply put, the identity of the lawyer matters, and the method of
compensating the lawyer is often crucial in determining who will provide
representation. It is in this context that the many studies done of the
inadequacy of representation in criminal cases can be understood. The
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants concluded:
1s. See, e.g., James C. Beck & Robert Shumsky, A Comparison ofRetained and Appointed Counsel
in Cases of Capital Murder, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 525 (1997) (finding that a death sentence
was more likely to result when the defendant was represented by appointed counsel than by
privately retained counsel); Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look
at Weak Cases, Prior Records and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253 (1989)
(finding that defendants represented by privately retained counsel obtained better outcomes
than defendants represented by public defenders). Not every study has found such
differences. See Roger A. Hanson & Brian J. Ostrom, Indigent Defenders Get the job Done and
Done Well, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLITICS AND POLICIES 254 (George F. Cole,
Marc G. Gertz & Amy Burger eds., 8th ed. 2002) (finding small differences in performance
between public defenders and appointed private counsel); Richard D. Hartley, Holly
Ventura Miller & Cassia Spohn, Do You Get What You Pay For? Type of Counsel and Its Effect
on Criminal Court Outcomes, 38 J. CluM. JUST. io63 (2010) (finding generally that public
defenders and private attorneys have no direct effect on incarceration or sentence length);
Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Costs and Quality of Indigent Defense: Ad Hoc vs.
Coordinated Assignment of the Private Bar Within a Mixed System, 1o JUST. SYS. J. 159, 170
(1985) (finding that the method of assigning attorneys to cases did not affect outcomes in a
statistically significant way).




Quality legal representation cannot be rendered unless indigent defense
systems are adequately funded. Attorneys who do not receive sufficient
compensation have a disincentive to devote the necessary time and
effort to provide meaningful representation or even participate in the
system at all. With fewer attorneys available to accept cases, the lawyers
who provide services are often saddled with excessive caseloads, further
hampering their ability to represent their clients effectively.20
The ABA Committee concluded "that inadequate compensation for indigent
defense attorneys is a national problem, which makes the recruitment and
retention of experienced lawyers extraordinarily difficult.""
The National Right to Counsel Committee similarly concluded:
"[I]nadequate financial support continues to be the single greatest obstacle to
delivering 'competent' and 'diligent' defense representation."" It noted that
"the most visible sign of inadequate funding is attorneys attempting to provide
defense services while carrying astonishingly large caseloads. Frequently,
public defenders are asked to represent far too many clients."2 Appointed
counsel are often paid so little that only those who cannot find other work are
available, and their compensation is so inadequate as to provide insufficient
incentives for the needed work."
This simple notion that one gets what one can pay for in representation is
reflected in studies done of the quality of representation in capital cases.
Professor Douglas Vick explains:
Several observers have noted that poor compensation will not attract
the best attorneys to represent indigents in death penalty cases. . . . For
example, as of January 1990, the Alabama attorneys who represented
defendants sentenced to death had been subject to disciplinary action,
including disbarment, at a rate twenty times that of the Alabama bar as
a whole. For those attorneys whose clients were executed, the rate of
disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times that of the bar as a whole.
One-quarter of the inmates on Kentucky's death row were represented
at trial by attorneys who subsequently were disbarred or resigned
2o. BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 7.
21. Id. at 9.
22. NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 6-7 (2009),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
23. Id. at 7.
24. Anderson & Heaton, supra note 15, at 188-96.
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rather than face disbarment. As of January 1990, nearly 13% of the
defendants executed in Louisiana had been represented by lawyers who
had been disciplined, while the disciplinary rate for the Louisiana bar as
a whole was 0.19%. In Texas, the attorneys who represented
defendants sentenced to death have been disciplined at a rate nine times
that of the Texas bar as a whole; similar disparities exist in Georgia,
Mississippi, and Florida.2 s
All of this has been exacerbated by the fiscal crisis facing state governments
and thus state courts across the country. The Report of the National Right to
Counsel Committee concluded: "[T]he country's current fiscal crisis, which
afflicts state and local governments everywhere, is having severe adverse
consequences for the funding of indigent defense services, which already
receives substantially less financial support compared to prosecution and law
enforcement.",,6 For example, California, which has one of the nation's largest
state court systems, reduced appropriations for courts by more than half in
2012, from $1.7 billion to $700 million, then "discovered" a budget surplus it
used to increase funding for education and health care in 2014, without
alleviating the prior court budget reductions. 7 Funding for defense lawyers
and all of the support they need has been cut from its previously inadequate
levels.
By every measure, then, there are gross inadequacies in the provision of
counsel to indigent defendants. The constitutional assurance of the right to
counsel is rendered illusory and innocent people are convicted as a result.28
25. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 398 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
26. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 22, at 7.
27. See COSCA Budget Survey 2012, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. 9 (2012), http://www.ncsc.org
/Information-and-Resources/Budget-Resource-Center//media/Files/PDF/Information
%2oand%2oResources/Budget%2oResource%2oCenter/COSCABudgetSurvey all states
2012.ashx (listing these figures); see also EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., 2013-14 GOVERNOR's
BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2013), http://www.dof.ca.gov/documents/FullBudgetSummary
web2013.pdf. Many states, though, had small or moderate increases in 2012, which
followed significant cuts in the prior years. The most recent budget data
shows that many states increased court funding last year. See Budgets & Funding,
NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTs., http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Budget
-Resource-Center/BudgetFunding.aspx (last visited May 21, 2013).
28. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 22, at 6 ("Wrongful convictions also have occurred as a result of





Why has the promise of Gideon been so poorly realized? I believe two
interrelated phenomena best explain this. First, the Supreme Court imposed an
unfunded mandate on state and local governments with the only realistic
enforcement mechanism being the finding of ineffective assistance of counsel
in individual cases. Second, the Court created a test for ineffective assistance of
counsel that makes it very difficult for a convicted individual to get relief, even
when counsel's performance is quite deficient.
As to the former, Gideon is atypical in American constitutional law because
it involves the Court finding an affirmative constitutional right to the
government providing a "service" to individuals. The rights in the Constitution
are generally thought to be negative liberties, prohibitions on what the
government may do. 9 The Constitution forbids the government from
abridging freedom of speech or denying equal protection of the laws or
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. There are exceptions where
affirmative duties are imposed by the Constitution, but these are regarded as
aberrations. As Professor Bandes notes:
Some constitutional provisions clearly mandate affirmative
governmental conduct. For example, the sixth amendment requires
government to provide an accused a speedy public trial, compulsory
process, assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to be informed of
the nature of the accusation and confronted with the witnesses against
him. The equal protection clause requires that government sometimes
take affirmative steps to ensure that certain groups are not treated
unequally; and has been held to mandate government provision of
goods and services which individuals would otherwise be denied
because of their poverty. The conventional wisdom views these
guarantees as aberrations; exceptions which prove the rule.30
Gideon, though, creates an affirmative constitutional duty for the
government to provide something to individuals: counsel in criminal cases
where there is a possible prison sentence, if necessary at the government's
expense. The Court, however, imposed this duty without providing a funding
source. It was left to each state, and in many instances each county, to provide
zg. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 873
(1986).
30. Bandes, supra note 3, at 2276-77 (footnotes omitted).
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funds for attorneys for indigent criminal defendants."
In the decades following Gideon, this burden increased tremendously as a
result of an enormous increase in criminalization, prosecution, and
incarceration. Nationally, five times more prisoners are incarcerated today than
just a few decades ago. 2 "Between 1991 and 1999, the number of children with
a parent in a Federal or State correctional facility increased by more than ioo
percent, from approximately 900,000 to approximately 2,000,000."" The
nation's incarceration rate is among the world's highest, and five to ten times
higher than the rates in other industrialized nations.- In other words, whatever
burden on state treasuries was envisioned by the Gideon Court, the dramatic
growth in criminal laws and criminal prosecutions made it vastly greater than
expected.
Among the many competing for scarce government resources, indigent
criminal defendants are hardly a powerful political constituency. Professor Vick
notes that in the context of inadequate representation for those facing death
sentences "f[t] he individuals adversely affected by this crisis - those accused of
aggravated murder - are the most hated and the least politically powerful in
the country, and political actors, including judges, are not highly motivated to
make unpopular decisions that would benefit them."" It is not surprising,
then, that the result is the inadequacy in funding of defense counsel described
above. The Supreme Court left it to the states to provide defense lawyers and
states often will choose the most inexpensive way to meet this obligation.
Actually, the problem is more subtle and more difficult. Gideon must mean
31. For example, Judith Kaye, then the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, formed a
commission that found that "New York's current fragmented system of county-operated
and largely county-financed indigent defense services fails to satisfy the state's constitutional
and statutory obligations to protect the rights of the indigent accused." Comm'n on the
Future of Indigent Def. Servs. Final Report to the ChiefJudge ofthe State ofNew York, N.Y. ST.
UNIFIED CT. SYS. 15 (June 18, 2oo6), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense
-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission-reporto6.pdf; see also In Defense ofPublic Access
to justice: An Assessment of Trial-Level Indigent Defense Services in Louisiana 40 Years After
Gideon, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N 1o-18 (2004), http://www.nasams.org
/DefenderEvaluation/laeval.pdf (describing the method of funding lawyers for indigents
in Louisiana).
32. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1272 (2004).
33- 42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(6) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
34. See MIcHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (describing incarceration rates, especially among African
Americans).




more than just a right to a lawyer: to have any meaning, it must be that there is
a right to competent counsel. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
effective assistance of counsel." This means that no criminal defendant is to be
left to the "mercies of incompetent counsel."" But whereas the existence of an
attorney for a criminal defendant is easily achieved, ensuring competent
counsel is far more difficult and elusive.
In theory, the right to competent counsel can be defined and ensured in a
systemic way. But in practice, the attempt to enforce a right to competent
counsel on a system-wide basis has proven futile. There have been many
challenges to the inadequacy of the system of providing criminal representation
within a jurisdiction. Challenges in federal court to the inadequacy of criminal
representation in state courts have been dismissed on abstention grounds, as
federal courts cannot interfere with ongoing state cases." Actually, those
seeking to bring a systemic federal court challenge to the underfunding of
defense counsel would face a procedural dilemma. If the suit were brought on
behalf of those in the midst of a state prosecution, the federal court would have
to abstain under Younger v. Harris.9 But if a suit were brought by those who
are not being prosecuted, there would be a serious issue concerning standing
and ripeness. This explains the failure of efforts in federal court to challenge
the inadequacies in the funding of defense counsel in state courts.
Nor are such systemwide suits in state court likely to succeed. For example,
in Florida v. Public Defender, the public defender office argued that inadequate
funding led to excessive caseloads that prevented it from carrying out its legal
and ethical obligations to indigent defendants. 4o The court, though, ruled that
the public defender was required to prove prejudice or the existence of a
conflict on an individual basis, separate from an excessive caseload in general,
to be relieved of its duty to represent indigent criminal defendants. Similarly,
in Kennedy v. Carlson, the court dismissed on standing grounds a challenge to
36. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
37. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
38. See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (1ith Cir. 1992) (rejecting a class action challenging
the Georgia public defense system); Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting an inmate's challenge to the Kentucky public defense system); Gardner v. Luckey,
500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting a class action challenging the Florida public defense
system); Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting a class action by inmates to
enforce their right to a speedy trial).
39. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts may not interfere with pending state court
criminal proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances).
40. 12 So.3d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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the inadequacy of the funding of public defenders in Minnesota. The court
explained that the chief public defender failed to show that indigent clients of
the public defenders' office had received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
insufficient funding. The court thus concluded that there was not a sufficient
showing of injury for standing purposes." As Professor Cara Drinan notes,
Historically, structural litigation -which has been defined as "a
sustained pattern of cases against large power structures invoking the
power of the courts to oversee detailed injunctive relief'-has been
sparingly used in the indigent defense context. It is estimated that no
more than ten of these suits were filed between 1980 and 2000.
Moreover, early suits seeking to improve indigent defense failed to
generate lasting reform.42
State courts have not been receptive to such claims and "to date, a federal
forum has not been available to indigent defendants seeking to vindicate their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a systemic basis." 4
The primary mechanism then for enforcing Gideon's promise has been an
individual criminal defendant's ability to argue that he or she received
ineffective assistance of counsel. But the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington" made it very difficult for courts to find ineffective assistance of
counsel, even when representation is very deficient. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the conservative majority, set a standard that only rarely allows a conviction
to be overturned for inadequacy of representation. The Court said that a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel requires demonstrating first that the
attorney's performance was so deficient "that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."s4 But even
serious errors by defense counsel are often not sufficient to overturn a
conviction or a sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, the
defendant must show prejudice; that is, he or she has to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different without
counsel's deficient performance.41 In other words, relief for ineffective
41. 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
42. Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation ofIndigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 427, 468 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of
Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REv. 434, 437 (2007)).
43. Id. at 468.
44. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
45. Id. at 687.




assistance of counsel requires that a convicted defendant show that the result of
the trial a reasonable probability would have been different if only the attorney
had acted competently.
This is usually an insurmountable burden. It is so easy for later judges to
say that they think the earlier judge or jury would have come to the same
conclusion anyway. Justice Marshall explained exactly this problem in his
dissent in Strickland: "[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant
convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have
fared better if his lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases
can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel." 4
My former colleague, Professor Dennis Curtis, has said that under
Strickland an attorney will be found to be adequate so long as a mirror put in
front of him or her at trial would have shown a breath. Professor Curtis
overstates, but not by much. I can identify only two cases in the 25 years since
Strickland in which the Supreme Court has found the prejudice required for
ineffective assistance of counsel."8 The latter of these, in 2005, was a five-to-
four decision, with Justice O'Connor concurring with the majority, reversing
an opinion written by then-federal court of appeals judge Samuel Alito.4 9
Moreover, these two cases that found ineffective assistance of counsel -
Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard-both involved inadequate
investigation by a defense counsel in a capital case. The Court's more recent
decision in Cullen v. Pinholster calls into question even these rulings in favor of
criminal defendants.so
Scott Lynn Pinholster was convicted of murder.s" His defense lawyers had
not been notified in advance that the prosecutor planned to present
aggravating circumstances in a penalty phase and therefore did not prepare to
present mitigating evidence." Nonetheless, the judge allowed the penalty phase
to go forward and the defense lawyers presented only one witness, Pinholster's
mother."
After Pinholster was sentenced to death and exhausted his appeals in
California state court, his new lawyers filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal
47. Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
49. Rompilla, 545 U.S. 374, revg Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F-3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
SO. 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011).
51. Id. at 1395.
s2. Id.
53. Id. at 1396.
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court. The lawyers provided declarations showing substantial new evidence
that supported the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal court
granted a hearing and the new evidence documented that the defense counsel
at trial had undertaken no investigation of mitigating circumstances and had
they done so they would have learned that Pinholster suffered from a brain
injury, a seizure disorder, and personality disorders. The evidence also
included testimony from family members and school officials about
Pinholster's abuse as a child.s4 All of this is powerful mitigating evidence that
might have caused the jury to have refrained from imposing the death penalty.
The federal district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and ultimately
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in an en banc decision. The Supreme Court,
though, reversed in an opinion by Justice Thomas. The Court held that the
federal district court should not have held the hearing on ineffective assistance
of counsel. The Court ruled that the federal court on habeas corpus is limited
to considering the evidence that was before the state court and cannot hold an
evidentiary hearing. The Court stated: "We now hold that review under
§ 22 54 (d)(i) is limited to the record that was before the state court that
adjudicated the claim on the merits."ss
The crucial flaw in this conclusion is that the habeas corpus statute
expressly allows federal courts to hold an evidentiary hearing. § 2254(e)(2)
specifies situations in which federal courts can hold an evidentiary hearing on
habeas corpus, including if "[a] factual predicate . . . could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence." The Supreme
Court essentially read this provision out of the statute in holding that federal
courts may not hold evidentiary hearings and must decide entirely based on the
record that was before the state courts.
The result is that individuals who have substantial evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel, or of a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence, or even of actual innocence, will be unable to present this material on
habeas corpus. In theory, the criminal defendants can go to state court, but
often state courts are unwilling to hear the evidence or simply deny claims
without a hearing and with no more than a postcard.
Moreover, the Court concluded, five-to-four, that the inadequacy of
Pinholster's defense lawyers was not sufficient to show ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Court stressed the need for great deference to the state courts and
concluded that Pinholster could not prove that he was prejudiced by the
54. Id. at 1396-97.




failings of counsel.s" But if this total failure of defense counsel to investigate
can be rationalized as a strategic choice of counsel and not prejudicial, there
will be few instances in which ineffective assistance of counsel can be
demonstrated.
Taken together, then, it is possible to explain the failure to implement
Gideon: The Supreme Court created a mandate without ensuring adequate
funding, state and local governments lacked political or legal incentives to
provide sufficient resources, and systemic litigation was unsuccessful, leaving
the determination of ineffective assistance of counsel in individual cases as the
only remedy. But the Court adopted a standard for this form of litigation in
Strickland v. Washington that makes it exceedingly difficult for a defendant to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The result is, as death penalty lawyer
Stephen Bright has declared, that "[n]o constitutional right is celebrated so
much in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel.""
III. THE LESSONS
A decade ago, on the fortieth anniversary of Gideon, an American Bar
Association Task Force recommended:
To fulfill the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel,
state governments should provide increased funding for the delivery of
indigent defense services in criminal and juvenile delinquency
proceedings at a level that ensures the provision of uniform, quality
legal representation. The funding for indigent defense should be in
parity with funding for the prosecution function, assuming that
prosecutors are funded and supported adequately in all respects.s"
The same recommendation is sure to be made again on this the fiftieth
anniversary of Gideon - and I predict it will be uttered in a decade on the
sixtieth as well.
Many lessons can be drawn from the manner in which Gideon has been
implemented. First, governments will not voluntarily adequately fund legal
services programs for the poor. So long as a program exists solely for indigents,
and especially a politically powerless group like poor criminal defendants,
s6. Id. at 1409 ("There is no reasonable probability that the additional evidence Pinholster
presented in his state habeas proceedings would have changed the jury's verdict.").
5. Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles into Reality, CHAMPION, Jan-Feb. 2003, at 6.
S8. BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 41.
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funding always will be insufficient. Neither the poor nor their attorneys have
sufficient political influence to ensure adequate resources.
Put another way, providing for criminal defendants is regarded as akin to
providing welfare. By contrast, the most successful programs politically are
those that benefit the nonpoor as well. For example, Social Security and
Medicare are perceived as insurance programs rather than welfare and thus
attract far greater support. A "civil Gideon" program that relies on voluntary
action by state legislatures for funding is likely to be inadequate for the same
reasons that the implementation of Gideon has been insufficient.
Second, creating an affirmative constitutional right requires a mandate to
ensure that it is adequately funded. The central problem in implementing
Gideon has been that the Court created an affirmative right and then left it to
the political process to fund. Unlike negative liberties, which generally involve
enforcing prohibitions, an affirmative right inherently requires attention to
how it will be financed. Moreover, it was left largely to state governments to
fund, and without any enforcement mechanism to ensure that funding was
adequate.
Third, creating a right to counsel is inadequate unless it is accompanied by
a mandate for effective counsel. But this creates an enormous problem in
assessing and ensuring effectiveness. Gideon assumed that it would be enough
for the Court to proclaim the existence of the right to counsel in criminal cases
in state court where there was a possible prison sentence. But the right is
meaningless without an assurance of effective counsel. Defining the standard
for effective assistance of counsel is inherently much more difficult than simply
requiring the presence of an attorney. The experience in the criminal context,
where the standard adopted by the Court in Strickland governs, raises great
concern about any effort to provide attorneys and the ability to assure their
competence.
Fourth, voluntary actions by the bar will not be sufficient to meet legal
needs. In theory, members of the bar could provide pro bono legal
representation for indigent criminal defendants. In reality, though, such
representation is woefully inadequate to provide for those who cannot afford
an attorney. Nor is there reason to believe that such voluntary actions could be
sufficient in providing for representation in civil cases under a "civil Gideon."
Fifth, systemic problems require systemic solutions. The inadequacy of
funding of defense counsel in a state must be dealt with in a systemic way. A
case-by-case assessment of adequacy does not succeed in dealing with the
overall problem. Yet procedural doctrines, such as abstention and standing and




who is being prosecuted in state court cannot, because of abstention
doctrines," challenge the adequacy of representation in a federal court action.
But a person who is not a defendant is unlikely to be able to meet the
requirements for standing and ripeness.
The result of all of this has to be a caution for efforts to expand the right to
counsel: An unfunded mandate to provide attorneys for the poor without any
mechanism for ensuring adequate resources is unlikely to succeed in providing
competent counsel. The solution, for Gideon and other areas to which it is
extended, is to provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure that adequate
resources are provided for retaining competent lawyers.
CONCLUSION
In observance of the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, many articles will be
written documenting its unfulfilled promise. Once more there will be proposals
to ensure adequate funding of criminal defense lawyers for the indigent. All of
this is important, and hopefully, this time, the proposals really will make a
difference and adequate resources will be devoted to ensuring adequate counsel
for indigent criminal defendants.
But I doubt it. My goal in these remarks has been to explain why Gideon
has not succeeded nearly as much as hoped. Unless these underlying causes are
addressed, it is difficult to see much chance for improvement. Unfortunately,
neither courts nor legislatures seem inclined to deal with the problem in
representation for criminal defendants. The result is a system that is deeply
flawed and that is likely to stay that way.
59. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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